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Abstract
The transformation of Germany’s political economy in the last few decades has
strongly been influenced by the SPD. Still, the economic programme of the
SPD remains contested since several authors characterise the party’s economic
platform differently. This paper reconsiders the political economy of the SPD
in light of evidence from the Great Recession. It combines quantitative content
analysis with process tracing in order to situate the party in research on the
moral economy of contemporary Germany. The quantitative content analysis
shows that the SPD attempted to shift its position on the welfare state and
economic liberalism in response to the crisis, but it remained wedded to ortho-
dox fiscal policies. Based on elite interviews with social democratic politicians
and policy-makers, the paper explains this response with the absence of an eco-
nomic paradigm. Weakened by internal conflict, the SPD made programmatic
decisions with reference to electoral calculations and it remained trapped by its
pre-crisis support for economic supply-side policies. Therefore, the SPD was
unable to oppose the conservative economic discourse in Germany and failed to
develop a consistent economic programme in response to the Great Recession.
Keywords: Social democratic parties, Great Recession, economic policies, auster-
ity, German politics.
∗The author gratefully acknowledges funding from the ERC Project “Political Conflict in Europe
in the Shadow of the Great Recession” (Project ID: 338875). I thank Hanspeter Kriesi, Dan
Kelemen, Tobias Schulze-Cleven, Sidney Rothstein, Josef Hien, and two anonymous reviewers for
very helpful comments and suggestions on this paper. A previous version of this paper was also
presented at a workshop for this special issue in San Francisco and I am very grateful for insightful
comments from all the other participants.
1 Introduction
In Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has played a central role in eco-
nomic policy-making in the last two decades. The party has been a member of the
federal government for sixteen out of the last twenty years and it implemented the
“Agenda 2010”, a set of liberal labour market and welfare state reforms still highly
contested in Germany. Consequently, the political economy of the SPD remains
equally contested and several scholars characterise the party’s economic platform
differently (Nachtwey, 2013; Merkel et al., 2008; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002). This pa-
per reconsiders the political economy of the SPD by using evidence from the Great
Recession, which presented the largest economic shock to the advanced economies
since the Great Depression.1 It exposed the weakness of the existing economic sys-
tem and challenged much of the conventional wisdom in political economy among
policy-makers and academics alike.
This paper therefore has two aims: to analyse how the SPD changed its economic
programme in response to the Great Recession and to explain this response. For
this purpose, the paper combines quantitative content analysis of election campaigns
from before and after the financial crisis with a qualitative case study based on elite
interviews with more than 20 social democratic politicians and policy-makers. The
quantitative content analysis shows that the SPD attempted to shift its position
on the welfare state and economic liberalism, but remained wedded to orthodox
fiscal policies in response to the crisis. Thus, the party’s programme remains full
of inconsistencies, and the paper explains this response by both electoral calcula-
tions and the lingering influence of economic ideas that shaped the party’s economic
programme prior to the Great Recession.
On the one hand, the SPD perceived voters to be fiscally conservative, who ex-
pected the government to balance its budget and reduce government debt. The
party was concerned with its reputation for economic competence and therefore at-
tempted to gain fiscal credibility by supporting fiscal consolidation (Kraft, 2017).
On the other hand, the SPD remained influenced by supply-side economics during
the crisis, which had shaped its programme prior to it (also see Bremer and Mc-
Daniel, 2019)). Due to the perceived economic success of the Agenda 2010, these
ideas were particularly prevalent in Germany and pushed the right wing of the SPD
away from traditional Keynesian thinking. At the same time, the Agenda 2010
also caused a political rift as the reforms were very controversial within the party.
They undermined the SPD’s ties with the trade unions and challenged the party’s
1The Great Recession is defined here as the economic crisis that begun in September 2008, when
the US investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed. It conceptualised both the 2008 financial crisis
and the Euro crisis as one economic crisis.
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social profile with significant electoral consequences (Schwander and Manow, 2017).
Weakened by these internal conflicts, the SPD lacked a clear economic paradigm
in the context of the economic crisis and was unable to oppose the prevailing con-
servative economic discourse, which is still influenced by ordoliberalism (e.g. Blyth,
2013; Young, 2014; Woodruff, 2016) and a moral view on the economy (e.g. Schulze-
Cleven and Weishaupt, 2015; Hien, 2017; Hien and Joerges, 2017). It embraced
an economic programme strongly affected by the perceived public opinion and the
economic mainstream, but one that ultimately remained wrought by inconsistencies
and contradictions.
To make this argument, the paper proceeds as follows. First, a review of the
existing literature provides a short account of the SPD’s economic policy since 1945.
Second, the paper uses quantitative content analysis to examine the economic pro-
gramme of the SPD as represented in election campaigns. To this end, the paper
utilizes a novel dataset including evidence from eight German elections and builds on
earlier research by (Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012). The paper then uses process-tracing
to explain the policies that the SPD adopted in the wake of the economic crisis.
It draws on insights from 21 elite interviews and complements them with evidence
from official documents and public statements by social democrats. Finally, the
conclusion summarises the main findings of the analysis and considers the impor-
tance of these findings to understand the recent trajectory of social democracy in
Germany.
2 The SPD’s Economic Programme before the Great
Recession
Following Peter Hall’s concept of “policy paradigms”, it is a common premise that
parties follow economic paradigms. These paradigms are coherent sets of ideas that
serve as prisms through which policy-makers see the economy and their role within
it (Hall, 1993, p. 279). However, these ideas are not fixed and instead there is a
large amount of ideational change over time (e.g. Hall, 1989; Blyth, 2002). This
has also been true for the SPD, which changed its economic policies significantly
since 1945. In the beginning of the post-war era, the SPD was still inspired by
Marxist ideas that had shaped the party in the previous decades (Berman, 1998).
The party remained in favour of interventionist policies (focused on the supply-side)
like nationalization, planning, and worker control that opposed the free market
(Allen, 1989, p. 273). However, in 1959 the SPD made a programmatic reversal and
broke with Marxism, when it adopted the Godesberger programme (e.g. Held, 1982;
Przeworski, 1985, p.32). It accepted the basic logic of the free market and embraced a
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Keynesian economic programme similar to that of other European social democratic
parties.
The SPD was able to put this programme into practice after it first entered
the federal government in the post-war era in 1966. It joined the CDU/CSU in a
grand coalition and Karl Schiller, a leading German professor of economics, became
finance minister. He responded to the economic crisis of 1966 and 1967 with a large
Keynesian stimulus programme. Afterwards, he codified Keynesianism into law by
passing the so-called Stabilitäts- und Wachstumsgesetz (Nützenadel, 2005, p. 123ff),
which recognized the government’s responsibility for maintaining employment and
mandated the government to act accordingly. This was the start of a brief Keynesian
period in Germany, during which active demand management was used to stabilise
the economy. It persisted during the grand coalition (1966-69) and the centre-left
government under Willy Brand (1969-1974).
However, Helmut Schmidt, who became the second SPD chancellor in the post-
war era in 1974, was more concerned with economic stability than most other social
democrats (Scharpf, 1991, p. 131).2 In the context of stagflation, he used his first
address to the Bundestag as chancellor to ‘repel all exaggerated [budget] demands’,
emphasising that his government would use ‘all constitutional and political possibili-
ties to commit the federal, Länder and local governments to a thrifty spending policy
from 1975 onwards’ (Schmidt, 1974, p.20). Still, Schmidt was pressured by the left
wing of his party and the US President Jimmy Carter to stimulate the economy
in the late 1970s. The latter wanted Germany to become the economic locomotive
for Europe and the rest of the world, and Schmidt partially conceded (Allen, 1989,
p. 279). He implemented two large stimulus programmes in 1977 and 1978, but
they did not have the desired effect. The autonomy of the central bank as well
as pro-cyclical deficit reductions at the state and local level undermined Keynesian
demand-management (Scharpf, 1991, p. 239), and eventually Schmidt turned away
from deficit spending. He gave in to demands from his coalition partner, the FDP,
to implement cuts to consolidate the budget, but in 1982 the coalition nevertheless
fell apart.
After 1982, the SPD remained in opposition for sixteen years. The party ini-
tially remained wedded to some form of Keynesianism, even if it was more open to
supply-side policies than other social democratic parties (Allen, 1989, p. 273). In
the late 1980s and the early 1990s the SPD became increasingly divided between
the so-called “traditionalists” and the “modernisers”, but the party’s direction of
travel was not entirely clear when the party won the elections in 1998. Instead,
2Helmut Schmidt still famously said that he would prefer five percent of inflation over five percent
of unemployment.
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there was a programmatic dualism personified by the chancellor Gerhard Schröder
and Oskar Lafontaine, the party leader and finance minister (Nachtwey, 2013, p.
238). This dualism turned into an open conflict, which culminated in the resigna-
tion of Lafontaine in March 1999 after he had only served in government for 163
days. Subsequently, the modernisers took control of most levers of government and
initiated a reform process.
The new finance minister Hans Eichel was concerned with the sustainability of
government debt and implemented fiscal consolidation. Even in the context of Ger-
many’s economic crisis in the early 2000s – when Germany was widely called the
‘sick man of the Euro’ (The Economist, 1999) – Eichel continued to implement a
restrictive fiscal policy.3 Moreover, Chancellor Schröder attempted to engineer a
broader push for reforms. He published a joint paper with Tony Blair, the British
Prime Minister and leader of the Labour Party, in which they laid out the rationale
for a new economic programme (Blair and Schröder, 1999), often labelled “Third
Way” (Giddens, 1998). Although Schröder and Blair stressed that they considered
demand- and supply-side policies complementary, the paper is mostly remembered
for outlining a new centrist economic strategy for social democratic parties in Eu-
rope that focused on supply-side reforms to achieve economic growth. Despite the
initial push by the modernisers, the SPD-led government struggled to implement
far-reaching reforms based on a corporatist strategy, i.e. an alliance for jobs based
on collaboration of the government with representatives of the trade unions and em-
ployers. Before the 2002 elections, Schröder created the so-called Hartz commission
with the task to develop recommendations for a labour reform. After the red-green
government was narrowly re-elected, Schröder intensified the push for reforms and
eventually he opted for a post-corporatist strategy (Nachtwey, 2013, p. 240). He
announced the Agenda 2010 in March 2003, implementing a set of reforms that
liberalised the labour market and the welfare state.
The Agenda 2010 can be seen as a significant re-orientation of Germany’s wel-
fare state and it was politically contested (Hassel and Schiller, 2010; Hegelich et al.,
2011). Still, there is not one dominant interpretation of the transformation that
the SPD underwent at the turn of the century. Seeleib-Kaiser (2002) argues that
the SPD converged with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), while for Merkel
et al. (2008) the SPD still stands for a form of “traditional social democracy”. In
contrast, Nachtwey (2013) argues that the SPD has undergone a process of adap-
tive self-transformation and now has a distinct model that he calls “market social
democracy.”
3Schröder eventually forced Eichel to withdraw from this position (see Figure 4) and Germany
was thus the first country (together with France) to break the Maastricht criteria. In 2004 the
federal government incurred the largest deficit in the post-war history.
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3 Economic Crisis and the Response of the SPD
The SPD remained in government until 2009, despite the electoral consequences of
the Agenda 2010 (Schwander and Manow, 2017). It lost the election in 2005, but
the CDU/CSU and the FDP fell short of a majority. The SPD thus joined a grand
coalition under the leadership of Angela Merkel, which governed Germany when the
financial crisis hit the advanced economies. After the fall of the American investment
bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008, several German banks were at the brink
of bankruptcy. Moreover, the financial crisis also led to the deepest recession since
the Great Depression and Germany’s economy shrank dramatically in 2009 (Figure
1). Although Germany’s domestic economy recovered relatively quickly beginning
in 2010, the German government remained in crisis mode for several years because
the Eurozone crisis kept a tight grip on the Euro.









































To examine the response of SPD to this economic crisis, I use an original dataset
based on quantitative content analysis that allows me to analyse both the positions
that parties take on different issues and the salience that they attribute to these
issues (see Bremer, 2018). Specifically, the analysis is based on the detailed cod-
ing of two newspapers during eight election campaigns. From each newspaper, a
representative sample of relevant articles is coded by using core sentence analysis
(Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings, 2001; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1997). The data has been
widely used by Kriesi et al. (2012, 2008) and Hutter and Kriesi (2019) to study po-
litical competition in Europe in the last few decades.4 It enables me to measure the
4A detailed explanation of how the dataset was created is included in Appendix A.
5
Table 1: List of economic issue categories (adopted from (Kriesi et al., 2008) and
(Bremer, 2018))
Categories Description of Left-Wing Positions
Welfare Support for the welfare state and redistribution
through taxes and benefits
Economic Liberalism Opposition to competition, deregulation, and pri-
vatization
Budgetary Rigour Opposition to a rigid budgetary policy and the re-
duction of taxes (without an explicit redistributive
character)
position of German parties on different issues over time because it includes data from
all elections since 1994 as well as data from the 1976 election as a benchmark.
The advantage of this dataset is that it allows me to classify economic issues into
three meta-categories that are concerned with the economy. As shown in Table 1,
these three categories are welfare, economic liberalism, and budgetary rigour.5 For
each category, I calculate two measures as explained in Appendix C. The salience
that parties attribute to each issue is simply the share of core sentences that a party
devotes to a given issue compared to all other economic issues during the election
campaign. The left-right position for a party on a given issue is the average direction
of all statements about that particular issue, which ranges from -1 to +1, where -1
is the left end of the spectrum and +1 is the right end of the spectrum.







To focus on the larger programmatic shifts of the SPD over time, I classify the
elections into five different periods, as shown in Table 2. For each period, I first
calculate the aggregate left-right position for the SPD and the CDU/CSU.6 This
allows me to test whether there was a “neoliberal convergence" (Roberts, 2014) prior
to the crisis, i.e. whether all the mainstream parties supported market liberalisation.
The results are shown in Figure 2. It indicates that in the 1970s, there was a
clear difference between the SPD and the CDU/CSU in economic terms, but that
5A list of all issues included in these categories is included in Appendix B.
6The left-right position for both parties is calculated by the mean of all statements from the
three economic categories, weighted by the salience of the individual categories.
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Note: The figure shows the weighted average position of the SPD and the CDU/CSU
on all economic issue categories (welfare, economic liberalism, budgetary rigour).
The positions are weighted by the relative salience of each category.
this difference became significantly smaller in the 1990s and 2000s. Before the
Great Recession, both the SPD and the CDU/CSU had moved towards the centre,
which limited the programmatic competition on the economy.7 This convergence was
partly reversed during the crisis when the SPD markedly moved towards the left, but
the left-ward shift of the CDU/CSU under Angela Merkel undermined the SPD’s
programmatic re-orientation. By adopting very similar positions, the CDU/CSU
neutralised much of the SPD’s programme (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019).8
To properly characterise the economic response of the SPD to the crisis, it is
useful to distinguish between the positions of the SPD on the three different eco-
nomic categories identified above. The results of this exercise are plotted in Figure
3. It shows that in the 1970s, the SPD still had a very consistent economic plat-
form that is in line with traditional left-wing positions. The party supported the
welfare state but opposed both economic liberalism and a rigid budgetary policy.
In 1976, the pragmatic Schmidt campaigned in the elections with the slogan “Vote
for Recovery”, but he also proposed to raise revenues by increasing taxes. In the
1990s, the SPD began its march towards the centre by changing its position on bud-
7For the SPD this move was in the spirit of the Third Way, which Blair and Schröder had
outlined in the late 1990s. As discussed above, this Third Way re-oriented social democracy and it
culminated in the Agenda 2010 that aimed to reform the German welfare state and labour market.
8During the crisis, the SPD also became challenged by electoral competition from the far left
after Die Linke was founded as a merger between the east-German Party of Democratic Socialism
(PDS) and the Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice (WASG) in 2007.
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Note: The figure shows the position of the SPD on different economic issue cate-
gories. +1 refers to support for budgetary rigour (circle), economic liberalism (tri-
angle), and opposition to welfare (square), respectively. The size of the symbols
corresponds to the relative salience of each category.
getary rigour, though. It shifted towards the right and adopted a position that was
not much different from the CDU/CSU. In the 2000s, this convergence of the SPD
and the CDU/CSU also extended towards economic liberalism. The SPD bought
into the dogma of the day and supported a flexibilisation of labour markets and a
deregulation of the economy, as set out by the Third Way (Nachtwey, 2013; Seeleib-
Kaiser, 2002). Interestingly, in the early 2000s the SPD hardly changed its position
on social policies despite passing the Agenda 2010. The party’s commitment to the
welfare state thus remained a corner-stone of its electoral programme even though
this commitment might not have been credible with the public.
In the wake of the financial crisis, the SPD changed its economic programme yet
again. The party shifted towards the left both on welfare and economic liberalism
and this shift was particularly large with respect to economic liberalism as social
democrats became a lot more sceptical about the merits of free markets. For exam-
ple, the SPD supported tighter regulation of financial markets and campaigned for
the introduction of a minimum wage. At the same time, the party did not change
its position on budgetary rigour and still retained a very centrist position during
the post-crisis election. Prior to the 2009 election, it had already supported the
introduction of the German Schuldenbremse (debt brake) and in the context of the
European sovereign debt crisis it retained its commitment to fiscal orthodoxy, i.e.
support for balanced budgets and low government debt. This created a significant
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tension within the programme of the SPD: it attempted to campaign on a left-wing
platform with regard to social policies and economic liberalism, but it also supported
conservative fiscal policies. To deflect from this inconsistency, the SPD increased
the salience of issues relating to the welfare state and economic liberalism, while
reducing the salience of budgetary policies. This was especially the case in 2017
when the SPD competed on a centrist fiscal programme that hardly featured in the
election campaign. Therefore, the party lacked a coherent platform based on an
economic paradigm, as defined by (Hall, 1993). Rather, the party combined individ-
ual policies from different sides of the economic left-right dimension in a piecemeal
fashion, which undermined the SPD’s ability to influence the economic discourse in
Germany.
4 Explaining the Response of the SPD to the Economic
Crisis
To explain the puzzling response of the SPD to the Great Recession, I use “explaining-
outcome process tracing” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Given the results from above,
the analysis mostly focuses on the SPD’s fiscal policies. It starts with the beginning
of the 2008 financial crisis and it ends in 2015 – when the Euro crisis reached its
latest climax (with the approval of the third Greek bail-out package) and public
attention turned towards the refugee crisis (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019). My main
sources are 21 elite interviews with SPD politicians and policy-makers conducted
between August 2016 and March 2018, but I complement this evidence with official
documents and public statements from leading social democrats. The interviews
allow me to unpack the official narrative behind the SPD’s economic programme
and to elucidate the causal mechanisms behind the party’s response to the Great
Recession. A full list of all interviews conducted is included in Appendix D, which
also explains the rationale for selecting the interviewees.9
4.1 The SPD during the Financial Crisis: Between Stimulus and
the Schuldenbremse
The SPD struggled to develop a coherent position on fiscal policies in response to
the Great Recession. Although it was the junior member in the grand coalition, it
controlled both the finance and labour ministry when the 2008 financial crisis hit.
Originally, Peer Steinbrück had planned to reach a balanced budget by 2011 after
9All translations of quotations from both interviews and secondary sources are my own.
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the centre-left government under Schröder had been widely criticized for breaking
the Maastricht criteria in the early 2000s. ‘There was a very clear anti-Keynesinian
attitude in the finance ministry’ (economic advisor, personal interview, 31/01/2018)
and several economic advisers reported that Steinbrück was hesitant to mobilise a
large amount of financial resources in autumn 2008. He famously said in September
2008 that the financial crisis was an American problem and ‘held the position for
a long time that Germany did not need to a stimulus package’ (economic advisor,
personal interview, 31/01/2018). In December 2008, Steinbrück even criticized the
stimulus programmes in the UK and elsewhere, saying that ‘the switch from decades
of supply-side politics all the way to a crass Keynesianism is breathtaking’ (Theil,
2008).
Ralf Stegner (personal interview, 19/12/2017), an influential politician from the
left of the party and deputy leader of the SPD, argued that in 2008, ‘the party
leadership struggled to shift from the Agenda 2010 towards a demand-driven policy.’
As Gustav Horn argued, before the crisis ‘the leading paradigm was that Keynesian
demand management does not work, which was also the dominant view among the
most senior politicians in the SPD’ (personal interview, 14/11/2017). Similarly,
another economic advisor to the SPD (personal interview, 15/03/2018) emphasised
that ‘the German view that debt is bad had been dominant within the SPD since
the departure of Lafontaine and the party did not have the self-confidence to step
out of the shadow and argue against this view.’
However, the view within the finance ministry and the SPD leadership did not go
unchallenged. According to Michael Dauderstädt (personal interview, 14/11/2017),
‘the SPD was also divided in this situation. The left wing argued very clearly for
economic stimulus programmes, but the right wing had reservations about the ef-
fectiveness of these programmes.’ Still, the voices demanding government action
became louder both within and outside the SPD as the crisis worsened.10 Eventu-
ally, the government agreed on a first stimulus package (Konjunkturpaket I ) on 5
November 2008, which was passed by the Bundestag in early December. The pack-
age was worth 12 billion Euro and Joachim Poß, responsible for budgetary affairs
in the SPD parliamentary group, justified the first stimulus programme by saying
that ‘we believe that it is right to let the automatic stabilizers of the budget work
in the current situation. We believe it is wrong to save in the downturn...We, in the
grand coalition, want to actively fight [the crisis]’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008a, p.
20238).
10For example, in October 2008, Joachim Poß already argued that ‘those who demand spending
cuts during the crisis, must not be in their right mind’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008b, p. 19328).
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The first stimulus programme was quickly dismissed as insufficient, though, as
it became obvious that the collapse of the world economy would have a large im-
pact on Germany’s export-oriented economy. Criticism from unions and employer
associations therefore grew louder, who strongly pushed for a different policy (eco-
nomic advisor, personal interview, 31/01/2017). They called for deficit-spending
(Farrell and Quiggin, 2017), and in response to the grim economic outlook at the
end of 2008, the SPD took up these calls for more action. It put forward a Pact for
Stability and Growth (SPD, 2009) on 4 January 2009, which called for increases in
government spending. Among other things, it demanded higher public investment,
additional training for the unemployed, a reduction in social security contributions,
and cash subsidies for car purchases. The SPD (2009) justified this pact by arguing
that
we want to cushion and shorten the imminent crisis with public invest-
ments, economic measures and incentives for consumption until the end
of 2010. For this purpose, we are prepared to temporarily put aside the
goal of balanced state and federal budgets. We act counter-cyclically.
Therefore, we believe that it is right and necessary that we pay for the
fight against the economic crisis by borrowing more.
Within the span of a few days, the German government largely followed the
proposals of the SPD and it agreed on a second stimulus package (Konjunkturpaket
II ) on 12 January 2009. The package was worth 50 billion Euro and it contributed
to a substantial increase in government spending in 2009 and 2010, as shown in
Figure 4. Therefore, the SPD eventually also supported fiscal stimulus packages that
can be described as “emergency” (Hall, 2013) or “liberal Keynesianism” (Pontusson
and Raess, 2012). Although the government was initially more reluctant to pursue
Keynesian deficit-spending than some of its European counter-parts (Vail, 2014;
Schulze-Cleven and Weishaupt, 2015), it still came a long way in rediscovering the
merits of Keynes.
However, the package was not so much influenced by an economic paradigm as by
the pressures of the day and the influence of trade unions and employer associations.
Poß (personal interview, 22/09/2016) argued that ‘in 2008 we had no textbook that
we could follow, but there was not much time to develop economic paradigms, either.’
Instead, Christian Kellermann (personal interview, 18/12/2017), a former advisor to
the SPD’s executive board and head of the economic policy unit of the SPD, argued
that ‘as a result of the pressure, a window of opportunity opened for government
stimulus programmes. For a short period of time, this became the new Zeitgeist as
it became clear that you had to do something in response to the crisis.’ Another
economic advisor emphasised that ‘in retrospect, Peer Steinbrück realized that he
11
had been wrong when all mainstream economists agreed that Germany would need
stimulus programmes’ (personal interview 15/03/2018).














































The stimulus programmes were also supported for electoral reasons. With nine
months until elections, the SPD believed that voters expected politicians to have
‘courage to take unconditional steps’ and to provide ‘clear guidance’ out of the crisis
(SPD, 2009). In this context, the SPD did not only justify additional government
spending as demand management pure and simple, but it also emphasised that the
additional spending should be used to improve economic productivity. For example,
it maintained that the stimulus programmes would ‘improve the infrastructure’ and
‘increase the potential and skills of people’ (SPD, 2009). This was in line with the
supply-side policies that the party had implemented before the crisis and helped the
party to justify its reversal to demand management.
The party’s ambiguous position towards Keynesianism also came to light when
the grand coalition changed the constitution to include the Schuldenbremse in May
2009. The initiative for this debt brake arose several years before the financial cri-
sis, but calls for such a debt brake grew louder as the government adopted deficit
spending. Eventually, both the federal and the state governments agreed to consti-
tutionally limit the size of public deficits: while the federal government would only
be allowed to run a deficit up to 0.35 percent of GDP, state governments would be
prohibited from running budget deficits at all.11 The Schuldenbremse still signalled
a clear commitment to fiscal consolidation among German policy-makers, and the
11In exceptional situations and in order to respond to economic downturns the federal government
would still be allowed to run larger government deficits.
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SPD was instrumental in ensuring its place in the German constitution.12 In the
parliamentary debate prior to the vote on the debt brake in March 2009, Steinbrück
called the Schuldenbremse a ‘decision of historic significance’ (Deutscher Bundestag,
2009, p. 24866). He argued that Germany was stuck in a vice of indebtedness and
emphasised that fifteen percent of the federal budget had to be used for interest rate
payments. This reduced the amount of money that the government could spend
otherwise and threatened the capacity of the state in the long-term. Therefore,
Steinbrück stressed that ‘a state that is able to act needs to have public finances
that are viable in the long-term’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009, p. 24868).
This position was shared among the right wing of the party. Carsten Schneider
(personal interview, 22/10/2016), a budgetary spokesperson for the SPD, empha-
sized that ‘higher debt generally also means that the government has to pay higher
interest rates. And I do not want us to use government’s current income for interest
expenses.’13 Similarly, Johannes Kahrs (personal interview, 16/08/2016), another
budgetary spokesperson for the SPD, argued that ‘higher debts are a burden on
future generations, and it is not fair, from the point of view of generational justice,
that we burden future generations with debts that take away all room for manoeu-
vre.’ Even Joachim Poß (personal interview, 22/09/2016) from the left wing of the
party argued that ‘there are also good reasons that the state gives itself room for
manoeuvre. The lower the debt, the higher the ability of the state to act.’ This is in
line with the “progressive consolidation view” (Haffert and Mehrtens, 2015), which
emphasises that consolidation is necessary to ensure the long-term capacity of the
state.
Although this view was popular among some SPD politicians, the Schulden-
bremse was ‘not a SPD project and it was very controversial within the party’
(Wolfgang Thierse, personal interview, 07/09/2016). The left wing of the party was
concerned that the Schuldenbremse would undermine the fiscal space available to
the state and threaten the provision of social services. They were supported by the
trade unions (e.g. Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2009) and by a public appeal from
economists spearheaded by Peter Bofinger and Gustav Horn, who argued that ‘the
restriction of the remaining room for manoeuvre for macroeconomic policies, which
the debt brake aims at, endangers the overall economic stability’ (Bofinger and
Horn, 2009).14 As a result, the Schuldenbremse only narrowly passed as nine-teen
12For example, the debt brake was prepared by the finance ministry, which continuously had been
under the control of the SPD since the 1998 election.
13Schneider had already been instrumental in putting the question of government debt on the
table prior to the economic crisis. He was the author of several papers with other SPD politicians
and policy-makers demanding immediate action on Germany’s debt.
14The appeal was signed by 64 Professors as well as more than 150 other economists.
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left wing social democratic MPs voted against the debt brake in the Bundestag and
three SPD-led state governments rejected the debt brake in the Bundesrat.
The stimulus packages implemented by the grand coalition had actually made
the passage of the Schuldenbremse more likely: against the background of the stim-
ulus, concerns about fiscal sustainability grew larger among voters and politicians.15
Consequently, the conflict within the SPD about the Schuldenbremse was decided by
tactical reasons. As Stegner (personal interview, 19/12/2017) argued, ‘there were
only very few people in the SPD that defended the Schuldenbremse on economic
grounds. However, the Zeitgeist was extremely powerful, and concerns that we
would be portrayed as a debt- and tax-raising party if we were to object to the debt
brake dominated the whole debate.’ Similarly, Poß (personal interview, 22/09/2016)
argued that ‘the project was very controversial, but in the political-tactical game
we were again and again confronted with the claim from the conservative side that
social democrats cannot deal with money. We wanted to counter this claim with the
debt brake.’ Philipp Steinberg (personal interview, 22/11/2017), then an economic
advisor to the SPD leadership, also argued that
we supported the debt brake because we wanted to throw out a certain
safety net for ourselves. We wanted to show that we responded to the
crisis, but that it is not a general rule that we - as social democrats -
cannot deal with money...There was some effort to make it clear that the
SPD was interested in sound fiscal policies.
The finance minister Peer Steinbrück especially pushed for the debt brake to
‘re-assure himself that the government’s actions were still in line with his pre-crisis
policies’ (economic advisor, personal interview, 15/03/2018). Yet, the foreign min-
ister Frank-Walter Steinmeier also put his weight behind the initiative. He had
already been chosen as the SPD’s candidate for the upcoming election in 2009 and
it was ‘very important for him that he was not being seen as the candidate that
could not deal with money’ (Heiko Geue, personal interview, 21/11/2017).16 In the
context of the upcoming electoral campaign, the leadership of the SPD was even
able to convince many from the left wing of the party. For example, Lothar Bind-
ing, the financial spokesperson of the SPD, argued that ‘the citizens wanted the debt
brake and as a party we could not escape this pressure in 2009. I always tried to
15Steinbrück explicitly linked the debt brake to the stimulus programmes, arguing that the debt
brake was necessary to ensure that the federal and state government would return to the path of
fiscal consolidation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009).
16For similar reasons, Steinmeier’s economic programme for the elections, the so-called Deutsch-
land Plan, also focused less on the demand-side policies pursued in response to the crisis but more
on supply-side policies to generate long-term growth. As one economic advisor put it, the SPD
‘never offensively claimed credit for the stimulus programmes...it did not correspond to the German
mainstream economic thinking’ (economic advisor, personal interview, 15/03/2018).
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explain why I did not think it was sound economic policy, but it was not a decision
of conscience for me, and thus, I followed the party line in the parliamentary vote’
(personal interview, 23/11/2017). As Thierse (personal interview, 07/09/2016) em-
phasised, the SPD realised that ‘to polarise and argue for debt is not popular...the
fear of accumulating debt is higher in Germany than it is in other countries.’ Ahead
of the elections, the SPD was unwilling to argue against this dominant view.
4.2 The SPD during the Eurozone Crisis: Between Opposition and
Government
In the 2009 elections, the SPD was neither rewarded for the stimulus programmes
nor for the debt brake. The party received a devastating 23.0 percent of the votes
and was forced to go into opposition. Subsequently, the SPD attempted to renew
its economic programme. Sigmar Gabriel, the new party leader, and Frank-Walter
Steinmeier initiated an economic council, which was supposed to help develop a new
economic profile for the SPD. The council included a very diverse range of advisers,
but the push for programmatic renewal was undermined by the Eurozone crisis
that began to overshadow day-to-day discussions (Michael Dauderstädt, personal
interview, 28/11/2017).
A detailed analysis of the SPD’s position on individual bailouts and policies is
beyond the scope of this article, but the party struggled to position itself in response
to the crisis in the Eurozone. In the beginning of the crisis, the SPD opposed the
government’s policies and abstained from the vote on the first Greek bailout and
the vote on the European Financial Stability Facility in the Bundestag.17 However,
in autumn 2010 the SPD reverted back into “grand coalition mode” and supported
all the other bailouts policies passed in response to the crisis (Degner and Leuffen,
2016, p. 11). Social democrats still tried to condemn the austerity regime created by
Angela Merkel and Wolfgang Schäuble, but struggled to consistently challenge the
government’s approach to the Eurozone crisis. They largely bowed to the German
government’s view that reckless fiscal spending by debtor countries had caused the
Eurozone crisis and that the crisis-ridden periphery needed to implement structural
reforms to get out of it.
Privately leading SPD politicians believed that Merkel’s strategy was wrong, but
they were lost when it came to developing an alternative strategy (Gesine Schwan,
personal interview, 11/08/2016). Importantly, the party was confronted with a
public debate that was very critical of European transfers and the SPD was very
17For example, it criticised the government for failing to share the costs of the bailouts with the
private sector and made its support conditional on a financial transaction tax (Wonka, 2016).
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aware of this sentiment. For example, Johannes Kahrs argued that it was very
difficult to explain to voters why Germany should continue to support the Greek
government:
When I discuss the issue of Greece in my constituency - whether it’s at a
house visit, at a public information stand, or even at the Stammtisch - a
lot of people say: “you are not serious that you want to again give 50, 60,
70, 80 billion Euro to Greece, are you? We vouch with our own money
for this. Are you insane?” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015a, p. 11383).
This perceived unpopularity of European transfers strongly influenced the SPD.
Several politicians confirmed that the SPD leadership believed that public opinion
could not be changed, i.e. they regarded themselves as unable to counter the dom-
inant public view that had emerged in Germany. For example, Stegner (personal
interview, 19/12/2017) argued that ‘to put it bluntly, the SPD was always afraid
to debate and propose solutions that had the slightest appearance of leading to-
wards a transfer union. The debates were always conducted aggressively against
the SPD, and in this respect the SPD also dreaded the debate and the prevailing
opinion.’ Similarly, Binding (personal interview, 23/11/2017) argued that ‘we did
not see an opportunity to change public opinion.’ In retrospect, SPD deputy leader
Thorsten Schäfer-Gümbel (personal interview, 13/12/2017) argued that ‘the SPD
was too intimidated during the Euro crisis. Especially with difficult questions, you
have to maintain your position, which we did not manage at the time.’ Instead,
social democrats accepted the dominant narrative about the Eurozone crisis as it
was portrayed in the media, and the party leadership chose to run with the majority
opinion.18
As a result, the party was constantly hedging and repeatedly changed its position.
More radical positions that would have challenged the government’s policy on the
Eurozone were quickly shelved (economic advisor, personal interview, 31/01/2018),
and the SPD made its European policy with reference to electoral considerations
and national parameters. As Dierk Hirschel (personal interview, 15/12/2017) put
it, ‘the fear of the Stammtisch was more important than economic arguments.’ This
was made explicit when Carsten Schneider emphasised that ‘we as the German par-
liament have to make decisions based on the legitimation that we received from
our voters. The SPD electoral programme from 2009 did not say that we sup-
port direct transfers to other national parliaments’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015b, p.
7224).
18Dauderstädt (personal interview, 14/11/2017) put this in the following way: ‘The party’s posi-
tion was very strongly driven by public opinion...It rather followed the popular Volksseele instead
of offensively advocating for other positions.’
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However, the SPD was not only influenced by electoral considerations, but it
was also trapped by its past economic policy. Following the logic of supply-side
economics, Germany had undergone painful economic reforms and austerity policies
before the crisis. Importantly, during the economic crisis, the Agenda 2010 became
increasingly seen as a success-story. While other countries were stuck in the crisis,
Germany bounced back relatively quickly and the headline figure of unemployment
remained low and continuously declined from 2009 to 2015 (Figure 5). The right
wing of the SPD that had supported the Agenda 2010 claimed that this economic
situation was the direct result of the reforms, which facilitated the interpretation of
the crisis as a morality tale of saints and sinners (Matthijs and McNamara, 2015).
As one economic advisor stressed (personal interview, 18/08/2016), ‘many people in
the SPD who pushed for the Agenda 2010 under Schröder felt compelled to support
Merkel’s Euro course.’ They argued that ‘policies that were good for Germany,
would also be good for other countries, without considering that austerity might be
counter-productive in the middle of the crisis.’
Therefore, the SPD turned towards supply-side economics to justify the lack of
European demand-management. Although many politicians were not ideologically
convinced by the virtue of austerity, the centrist wing in the party believed that
structural reforms were important to solve the crisis and that these reforms would
not be pursued if the debtor countries had more fiscal space. According to Schneider
(personal interview, 20/10/2016), his experience was that governments would use
fiscal space to reduce taxes instead of making productivity-increasing investment.
This view was largely in line with the majority of German economists and the
17
CDU/CSU and therefore the SPD found it difficult to oppose the government’s
policy. Many SPD politicians, and especially those from the left wing of the party,
believed that austerity was the wrong policy (political advisor, personal interview,
19/10/2017), but they were not completely convinced by the virtue of Keynesian
demand-stimulus, either.
At the same time, the Euro crisis also had an influence on Germany’s domestic
economic policy. In Germany, the economy improved in 2010, as shown in Figure 1
above. In the context of the first Greek bail-out, Wolfgang Schäuble argued for fiscal
consolidation at home and introduced spending cuts in June 2010. While the trade
unions heavily criticised these spending cuts for their redistributive consequences
(Vail, 2014), the SPD only put up mild opposition. According to the dominant view
in Germany, the crisis illustrated the dangers of too much government debt (Haffert,
2016, p. 27), which strengthened the German suspicion towards public and private
debt.19 Data from the Eurobarometer, shown in Figure 6, indicates that a large
majority of Germans agreed that the reduction of Germany’s government debt was
a priority throughout the crisis. This pervasive support for fiscal consolidation also
influenced the fiscal policies of the SPD. For example, Schäfer-Gümbel (personal
interview, 13/12/2018) argued that ‘it was the majority opinion in the leadership
of the SPD that you would not survive a mainstream that is clearly against public
debt.’20 In 2011, the SPD agreed to a motion at their party convention, which
made the connection between the Euro crisis and domestic policy explicit. It said
that ‘the crisis in the European Monetary Union shows us with a new urgency
that government borrowing needs to be reduced. That is why we will consistently
comply with the debt rules and use economic tax revenues to reduce borrowing’
(SPD Fraktion, 2011).
The SPD continued to support orthodox fiscal policies when it returned to power
in 2013 as a member of the second grand coalition under Merkel. The finance min-
istry remained in the hands of Schäuble, who presented a balanced budget in the
beginning of the legislative period (achieving the so-called Schwarze Null). Despite
national and international demands that Germany’s government should spend more,
the SPD was hesitant to question this policy. Germany’s debt-to-GDP ratio still re-
mained above the criteria laid out in the European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
of 60 per cent and public discourse in Germany was very concerned about lowering
19This suspicion is, for example, illustrated by the fact that Angela Merkel already referred to
the Swabian housewife to whom ‘money saved is money earned’ in 2009 (Benoit, 2009).
20Sigmar Gabriel, who became leader of the SPD in 2009, charted this path. Several politicians
and economic advisers described him as a strategic opportunist, who carefully listened to the public
mood and opinion polls. Reportedly, he even made his decision to step down as a party leader in
January 2017 with reference to opinion polls, which he had commissioned. This style of making
decisions was representative for his tenure as party leader from 2009 to 2017.
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Note: The figure shows the share of respondents, who agree or disagree with the
statement that ‘reducing public debt in Germany cannot be delayed.’
debt. Internally the SPD regularly still had controversial debates, but in public
the SPD even presented the Schwarze Null as a success. For example: Kahrs in-
sisted that, ‘finally, we are on the way to breaking this dangerous debt spiral...we are
reaching a balanced budget...Wir Roten kämpfen für eine schwarze Null’ (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2014c, p. 2244). Similarly, Thomas Oppermann justified the SPD’s sup-
port for the balanced budget by arguing that ‘only a state that has financial leeway
can invest, shape and redistribute’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014a, p. 4567). Several
social democrats emphasised that consolidation was not a fetish, but they returned
to arguments about intergenerational justice and the capacity of the state to act in
line with the progressive consolidation thesis. This argument was pervasive within
the SPD because it allowed the party to legitimise fiscal consolidation on its own
terms. In the context of demographic change resulting from an ageing society, the
SPD attempted to present fiscal consolidation as an inherently social democratic
policy (due to its concern with intergenerational equity).
The Schwarze Null was also supported due to its popularity among voters. In
a survey from the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 66 percent of the population were
in favour of balanced budgets.21 Schäuble gleefully cited these survey results in
a parliamentary debate saying that ‘if you criticise this fiscal policy, you speak
21A summary of the results from the survey is available here: http://www.forschungsgruppe.
de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer_2014/November_II_2014/ [accessed 20 Oc-
tober 2018].
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against the broad conviction of the population as well as the scientific expertise in
Germany’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014b, p. 6420). This was also important for the
SPD. Kahrs (personal interview, 16/08/2016) emphasised that ‘we cannot find a
majority in Germany for an alternative policy, not with our coalition partner and
not with the prevailing public sentiment in Germany.’ Thus the SPD joined the
‘competition in which balanced budgets were used as PR strategy to demonstrate
economic competence’ (political advisor, personal interview, 19/10/2018).
At the same time, the SPD was also aware that Germany’s economic positions
was threatened by a lack of investments. Before the federal election of 2013, studies
by several economic institutes showed that Germany’s public and private investments
were chronically low compared to other European countries (e.g. Bach et al., 2013).
The SPD took up this agenda and in August 2014 Sigmar Gabriel asked Marcel
Fratzscher, the President of the German Institute for Economic Research, to chair a
commission tasked to address the problem. Still, the SPD remained cautious and did
not support large increases in government spending to finance public investments.
When it became clear in October 2014 that the economy was growing more slowly
than expected, the party did not abandon the aim of balancing the budget – rather
social democrats perceived it as a dual challenge to simultaneously balance the
budget and increase investments. Some politicians within the party accepted that
these aims were partly contradictory, but the party resolved this challenge by arguing
that Germany’s big problem was the lack of private and not public investments. For
example, in 2014 Oppermann said that ‘we do not need any debt-financed short-
term flash in the pan programs for the economy, but strategies for more private
investments’ (Oppermann, 2014). As a result, the SPD only pushed for relatively
small increases in public investment and, officially, never questioned the doctrine of
balanced budgets.22 Rather, it was content to administer the budget surplus jointly
with its coalition partner (Rixen, 2018).
Finally, the SPD was also influenced by both public opinion and its historical
support for supply-side economics in the discussion about Germany’s current account
surpluses, which became contested and was widely criticised by other countries in
the course of the Eurozone crisis. The left wing of the party was very critical
of Germany’s surplus (personal interview, economic advisor, 15/03/2018), but the
party’s leadership took a different position. They did not deny that the current
account imbalances in Europe were a problem, but they insisted that reducing them
22For example, in a joint press release the budgetary spokesmen Schneider and Kahrs emphasised
the importance of the balanced budget in 2015 and explicitly argued that ‘a balanced budget and
higher investments are not a contradiction’. However, in the same press release, they stated that
‘with higher public investment, we are securing the maintenance and expansion of the infrastructure
and, thus, the future viability of the country’ (SPD Fraktion, 2015).
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was difficult for the government. Steinberg (personal interview, 22/11/2018) argued
that ‘reducing current account surpluses is not trivial’ and, among other things, he
pointed to the limited ability of the government to control wages due to the German
Tarifautonomie. Yet. the decision to do little about the current account surpluses
was also adopted for political reasons. As one economic advisor (personal interview,
31/01/2018) put it, ‘how can you explain to citizens that an economy can be too
competitive and that the current account surpluses can be too high?’ The SPD did
not have a consistent economic paradigm to answer this question, which prevented
the SPD from challenging the European imbalances.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The SPD lacked a clear economic compass in the context of the Great Recession. In
response to the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression, the SPD partly
moved away from the Third Way and questioned economic liberalism again. The
party did not officially back-track on the Agenda 2010, but it shifted towards the
left on social policies and successfully pushed for the introduction of the minimum
wage in 2013. At the same time the SPD supported orthodox fiscal policies that
undermined its ability to present a coherent economic platform. Although the party
implemented emergency policies in the wake of the financial crisis, it did not re-
discover Keynes. Instead, it supported the Schuldenbremse and fiscal consolidation
at home and abroad during the Eurozone crisis. This created a situation, in which
the economic programme of the SPD was often unclear. As Schäfer-Gümbel (per-
sonal interview, 13/12/2017) remarked, ‘the red threat was not clear enough...we
did not have the necessary explanations and we were not brave enough to go into
the political dispute and present our positions more clearly.’
Consequently, my analysis suggests that the SPD is a party without a paradigm,
which also explains the difficulty of the existing literature to characterise the party’s
programme. Until this day, the SPD remains internally divided into different factions
with different economic ideas: while the left wing remains wedded to a Keynesian
understanding of the economy, the right wing of the party is much more influenced
by supply-side economics and the German economic mainstream. Lacking a com-
mon prism to interpret the world around them, the SPD often reverted to electoral
considerations to define its economic positions. The party’s support for orthodox
fiscal policies was thus largely a defensive reflex: the party believed that it could not
withstand the dominant German discourse. As concerns about the public debt grew
larger during the economic crisis, the SPD’s leaders were worried about their reputa-
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tion for economic competence and they were quick to ascertain fiscally conservative
positions.
In the context of the Eurozone crisis, this position became solidified because
the SPD found itself in an ideational and discursive trap. After the party had
implemented the Agenda 2010 and fiscal consolidation before the financial crisis,
Germany’s relative economic success prevented the party from disavowing these
policies. As a result, people who pushed for a paradigm change inside the SPD were
in a difficult situation: trapped by the party’s previous economic discourse, SPD
leaders often combined electoral opportunism with technocratic policy initiatives.
Although many social democrats believed that imposing austerity on the crisis-
ridden periphery was wrong, they were strongly influenced by the dominant German
narrative and thus the party was constantly hedging and unwilling to take a clear
stance.
In the long-term, this acceptance of fiscal orthodoxy was bad politics, indepen-
dently of the economics. It contributed to a convergence of mainstream political
parties in Germany and undermined the SPD’s ability to develop a coherent eco-
nomic programme.23 Almost ten years after the beginning of the financial crisis,
this also played a role in the party’s defeat in the 2017 elections, when the SPD
experienced its worst electoral result in the post-war period. The causes of this
defeat are multifaceted, but the inability of voters to differentiate between the SPD
and the CDU/CSU was an important factor. Accepting the dominant fiscal and
economic framework of the conservative party, the SPD was unwilling to introduce
more radical economic policies that could have given it a new profile. Although the
party attempted to campaign on a platform that put social justice front and centre,
it lacked a coherent narrative that challenged the dominant conservative economic
discourse in Germany. As long as the SPD does not break free from this discourse,
it will remain trapped by its own triangulation.
23As shown above in Figure 2, the lack of difference between the SPD and the CDU/CSU also
emerged because the CDU/CSU under Angela Merkel strongly moved towards the left. Partly, the
CDU/CSU adoptd social democratic positions to demobilise SPD voters.
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The data was collected as part of the XXX project at XXX. For each election, we
selected all newspaper articles that were published within two months before the
national election day and reported on the electoral contest as well as national party
politics more generally. Editorials and commentaries were excluded and the selection
of articles was done by an extensive keyword list including the names and abbrevia-
tions of political parties and key politicians from each party. We then coded a sample
of the selected articles using core sentence analysis (CSA). Following this type of
relational content analysis, each grammatical sentence of an article is reduced to its
most basic ‘core sentences’ structure, which contains only a subject, an object, and
the direction of the relationship between the two. The core sentence approach was
developed by Kleinnijenhuis et al. (1997) and Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings (2001)
and later extensively used by Kriesi et al. (2008) and Kriesi et al. (2012). This type
of quantitative content analysis allows us to study both the salience that parties
attribute to certain issues and the positions that they take towards these issues.
For this purpose, we quantify the direction between actors and issues by using a
scale ranging from −1 to +1, with three intermediary positions −0.5, 0, and +0.5.
For example, the grammatical sentence “Party A calls for leaving the Eurozone but
supports a haircut on the country’s debt” leads to two coded observations: (Party
A −1 Eurozone; Party A +1 haircut).
Table 3: List of vague issues included in the data
Category Issue
Welfare Reduction of unemployment
Welfare Reduction of youth unemployment
Economic liberalism Support small and medium enterprises
Economic liberalism Export oriented measures
Economic liberalism Measures to promote innovation
Economic liberalism Promotion of national business
Budgetary rigour Measures to fight economic crisis
Therefore, the coding procedure is, in principle, relatively simple. However,
there are also some difficult decisions that one has to make when coding articles. For
example, it is often difficult to disentangle whether a sentence includes clear partisan
statements that can be used to extract a direction between an actor and an issue
or another actor. In general, we always tried to code as many sentences as possible
including vague ones. Consequently, our list of issues also includes statements that
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could be considered valence issues, as defined by (Stokes, 1963). For example, a
list of such issues with regard to the economy is shown in table 3. Generally, most
actors agree on these issues and, hence, they do not help to classify parties based
on their (relative) positions. Still, I keep all observations on these issues in the
dataset in order to study salience. The only observations that are excluded from
the analysis in this paper are actor-actor sentences without an issue reference. They
neither include information about salience nor positions. Technically, actor-actor
sentences with an issue reference are also not included in the analysis. However,
during the coding procedure we always automatically coded all actor-issue sentences
that derived from actor-actor sentences with an issue-reference (as shown above) and,
hence, my analysis still captures the importance of these sentences for salience.
For the coding of the German elections we used one tabloid and one broadsheet
newspapers. Specifically, we coded articles from the Süddeutsche Zeitung and Bild.
To create the dataset, we coded the function, party affiliation, and (if available)
name of actors, but for the present analysis the actors were grouped according to
their party family. The issues, in turn, were coded inductively, i.e. coders were
given a long list of possible issues but they were encouraged to add to this list
during the coding procedure. This resulted in more than 200 coded issues per
election campaign and, as described in the main text, the issues were then aggregated
into three economic categories prior to the analysis. Note that each category that
I identified includes several different issues, as listed in B.These issues, in turn,
often contain several sub-issues that were coded inductively. For example, the issue
‘budgetary rigour’ contains the following sub-issues: ‘budgetary rigour (in general)’,
‘austerity measures’, ‘fighting deficit’, and retrenchment’. Note that I decided to
split issues relating to taxation into two different categories: taxes with an explicit
redistributive character (e.g. wealth tax, tax on top-income levels, etc.) were coded
as redistribution (i.e. welfare), whereas all other statements about taxation that
were more general were coded as budgetary issues.
The major benefit of using an inductive coding procedure is that it allows one
to study the full complexity of political competition by coding all statements in the
media irrespective of pre-developed categories. Still, there are some disadvantages
of studying political competition in this way. First, the major disadvantage is that
the data collection is very work intensive because it relies on manual coding. Coder
disagreement is potentially also a problem but based on the experience of previous
rounds of data collection, we attempted to reduce coder disagreement. For this
purpose, we relied on refined coding instruction, trained all coders intensively and
continuously monitored their progress. Moreover, each electoral campaign in a given
country was coded by at least two coders to reduce individual biases. A third
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potential problem for our data is that it relies on the media to represent the positions
of parties. Given that there is some variation in the way that different newspapers
report on political competition this might introduce some biases. As a result, in
some instances the representation of parties varies across newspapers, but these
variations are generally small and not systematic. Moreover, using other data to
check the robustness of our findings shows that by and large our coding procedure
leads to positions that are similar to those recorded in other datasets (also see
Helbling and Tresch, 2011).
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B List of Issues by Category





























To study the salience that parties attribute to certain issues and the positions that
parties take towards these issues, I calculate two key measures from the data. First,
salience is measured by the share of core sentences coded for a party on a given
issue category compared to all the sentences coded for that party. For example, if
there are 10 core sentences for party A and three of these core sentences are about
welfare policies, then the salience of welfare for party A is 3/10 = 0.3. Second, I
calculate the left-right position for a party as the average direction of all statements
on an issue category, which ranges from −1 to +1 where −1 is the left end of the
spectrum and +1 is the right end of the spectrum. For example, if party A has
two positive statements (+1) and one negative statement (−1) towards welfare, the
average position of party A towards welfare is 1 + 1 + (−1)/3 = 0.33. Using these
simple rules, I get a dataset with the salience and the positions for each party on
each category for every election.
I also use these measures to calculate the salience and left-right position for every
party on the aggregate level, i.e. for all economic issues. The salience of all economic
issues for a party k is simply the sum of party-specific salience of all the three issue
categories:
Aggregate Saliencek = swelfare,k + secolib,k + sbudget,k (1)
where swelfare,k is the number of core sentences for party k about welfare while
secolib,k and sbudget,k are the number of core sentences for party k about liberalism and
budgetary rigour, respectively. The aggregate left-right position for any given party
k is calculated as the mean of all statements from the three economic categories,
weighted by the salience of the individual categories. It is computed as follows:
Aggregate Left − Right Positionk =
swelfare,k ∗ x̄welfare,k − secolib,k ∗ x̄ecolib,k − sbudget,k ∗ x̄budget,k
swelfare,k + secolib,k + sbudget,k
(2)
where x̄welfare,k is the average position of party k on welfare while x̄ecolib,k and
x̄budget,k are the average positions of party k on economic liberalism and budgetary
rigour, respectively.
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D List of Interviews Conducted
I selected my interview partners by combining a ‘purposive sampling method with a
‘chain’ or ‘snowballing’ sampling method. I first tried to identify the key politicians
and policy-makers that influenced the response of the SPD to the Great Recession.
Second, I encouraged my initial respondents to suggest other people, who are relevant
to answer my research question (Biernacki andWaldord, 1981; Farquarharson, 2005).
In this way, I tried to identify influential players, who are not obvious ex ante.
Based on this reasoning, I conducted interviews with the following 21 policy-makers
between August 2016 and March 2018:
• Anonymous, Advisor to the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag
• Lothar Bindig, MP and spokesperson for financial affairs of the SPD parlia-
mentary faction
• Michael Dauderstädt, former head of the Economic and Social Policy depart-
ment of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
• Sebastian Dullien, Professor of Macroeconomics at the HTW Berlin University
and economic advisor to the SPD
• Henrik Enderlein, Professor of Political Economy at the Hertie School of Gov-
ernance and economic advisor to the SPD
• Andrä Gärber, head of the Economic and Social Policy department of the
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
• Heiko Geue, former head of Political Staff at the Federal Ministry of Finance
• Björn Hacker, Professor at the HTW Berlin University of Applied Sciences
and Former analyst at the Friedrich Ebert- Stiftung, Berlin
• Dierk Hirschel, Chief Economist at ver.di United Services Trade Union and
member of the Commission for Fundamental Values of the SPD
• Gustav Horn, Academic Director of the Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK)7
• Johannes Kahrs, MP and budgetary spokesperson of the SPD parliamentary
group
• Christian Kellermann, former advisor to SPD’s executive board and head of
economic policy unit
• Joachim Poß, Former MP and deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary
group responsible for economic affairs
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• Carsten Schneider, MP and First Secretary of the SPD parliamentary group,
former Deputy Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group responsible for eco-
nomic affairs
• Gesine Schwan, head of the Commission for Fundamental Values of the SPD
• Philipp Steinberg, Director-General for Economic Affairs at the Federal Min-
istry of Economic Affairs and Energy and former senior advisor to SPD Chair-
man Sigmar Gabriel
• Gerald Steininger, senior advisor on financial affairs of the SPD parliamentary
group
• Ralf Stegner, deputy leader of the SPD
• Thorsten Schäfer-Gümbel, deputy leader of the SPD
• Kerstin Villalobos, senior advisor on European politics of the SPD parliamen-
tary group
• Wolfgang Thierse, former President of the Bundestag and deputy chairman of
the SPD
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